McCain Institute Senior Director of Global Democracy Programs Laura Thornton compares democracy protest movements in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh to the ongoing battle between pro-democracy Georgians and the Georgian Dream party in her op-ed, “How can the protestors win?” Read HERE or below.
Op-Ed: How can the protestors win?
Civil Georgia
By Laura Thornton
February 19, 2025
https://civil.ge/archives/663150
Following the October 2024 elections in Georgia, which were deemed neither free nor fair by reputable international and domestic observers, the Georgian Dream party illegally convened parliament, appointed a new president, and withdrew the country from the European Union accession process. The U.S. has sanctioned Georgia’s ruler, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, for serving the interests of the Kremlin, which wants Georgia to become a pliant, subservient satellite like Belarus. The Georgian people, who see their country as European and democratic, have rejected this dystopian vision and have been protesting for two months, calling for new elections. Since the protests began, over 500 people have been arrested and 300 tortured by Georgian Dream thugs.
While the protests have continued, so has Georgian Dream’s determination. More people are arrested and beaten every day, and the regime passed a new package of repressive laws criminalizing criticism of the government, restricting speech and assembly, violating due process for protestors, and removing NGO participation in policy decision-making. A new media law will redefine journalistic ethics and ban foreign funding for media. The country is at an impasse, and it is unclear which way things will break.
What makes a democratic protest movement succeed? There is no clear roadmap, and ingredients are varied and sometimes random. Often, preexisting cracks or conflicts within the ruling leadership or economic indicators make a regime vulnerable. Sometimes, the most overwhelming and innovative movements – like the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong – still fail against a simply impenetrable giant. But success is usually determined by internal, not external, pressures. The fiercest of international responses – sanctions, lack of recognition, embargoes – are not the decisive factor (Venezuela, exhibit A).
Georgians have their own history of inspirational democracy movements, as have their sisters and brothers in Ukraine, with “Maidan” having become a global call to freedom. Having lived decades in Asia, I’m drawn to several other extraordinary examples of unseating dictators whom no one thought would ever leave, such as Ferdinand Marcos, Suharto, and Sheik Hasina.
In 1986, voters went to the polls in the Philippines with the goal to fire Ferdinand Marcos, yet the corrupt election commission declared Marcos the winner. Thankfully, NAMFREL, one of the world’s first election monitoring organizations, had carried out a parallel vote tabulation, where independent observers in each polling station recorded the results. As such, NAMFREL was able to prove the real results of the elections, which was a definitive loss for Marcos. Marcos dug in, and opposition leader Cory Aquino urged Filipinos to overwhelm the streets in what became known as the People Power Revolution. More than a million people marched in the streets across the country. Importantly, the leaders of the influential and beloved Catholic Church joined in, including the archbishop of Manila. Many in the security forces refused to arrest the protestors and instead joined them. Nuns famously put flowers in the gun barrels of tanks pointed at them. But it wasn’t only about protesting – across the country, people refused to pay their bills (gas, electricity, etc.) and boycotted all government services, such as banks, transport, and postal services. Further, the country descended into a nationwide strike. In the end, it took the entire country screeching to a halt to topple a dictator. Marcos fled.
In 1998, widespread protests erupted in Indonesia against the corrupt regime of Suharto. Though initiated by university students, everyday citizens joined the movement, frustrated by high prices and the economic fallout from the 1997 financial crisis. Violence carried out by security forces inflamed nationwide riots and vandalism, many instigated by the regime as a pretext to crack down further against democracy activists. Protestors took over radio studios, flooding the airwaves with demands for Suharto’s resignation, and students occupied part of parliament. Ultimately, the carnage proved too much for many in Suharto’s elite circle, and political leaders removed their support for Suharto, and the military refused orders to use force against protestors occupying parliament. Suharto resigned before he could be impeached.
More recently, last summer, students in Bangladesh peacefully protested quota allocations for government jobs, which was seen as a form of corrupt political patronage. Police responded to the protests with batons and tear gas, ultimately killing student leader Abu Sayed. The quotas, though not the most pressing issue facing society, were the proverbial straw for Bangladeshis tired of living under Sheik Hasina’s iron fist. The government imposed a communications blackout, imposed curfews, and ordered the army to shoot on sight. Protests continued. Importantly, the protests did not start in the capital city but rather outside Dhaka, where students quickly united with workers to build a mass movement, tapping into a wide range of grievances. In the end, the army refused to follow Hasina’s orders, fueled by outrage at the violence but also their own simmering dissatisfaction with the regime. Hasina fled the country.
All three stories are unique but have a few common threads. Regardless of what instigated the protest movement, it managed to tap into much deeper and widely held societal grievances related to longstanding economic woes, corruption, and repression. As such, the movements attracted the whole of society and took place outside the capital city. Further, people made the countries basically ungovernable through national strikes and boycotts. Importantly, given the enormity of participation in the movements, even the security forces and military were, in many instances, personally connected to the protestors. Interestingly, while the international community played some role – in the case of Marcos offering safe harbor after he surrendered – its actions were largely not part of the story.
Unlike Georgia, in these cases, people had been repressed for so long that the tragedy of protestors dying at the hands of the government was the “bridge too far” that galvanized people to the streets who otherwise might have stayed home. And for many in the regime, the violence contributed to the defections needed to unseat the dictator.
But the resilience of the protestors in Georgia reminds me of these other democracy heroes in other ways. Efforts to connect the protests beyond EU membership and elections to the deeper grievances and bread-and-butter concerns of Georgians have yielded more broad-based support. Advancing the movement from nightly protests to the stage of day-long, nationwide civil disobedience and strikes – garbage not collected, bank tellers not going to work, truck drivers staying home — would paralyze the economy and greatly enhance the pressure on the Georgian Dream. In the end, it is often a game of numbers – the massive onslaught that overwhelms and ultimately shames those in power.